Combing for Credentials: Active Pattern Extraction from Smart Reply

Abstract

With the wide availability of large pre-trained language models such as GPT-2 and BERT, the recent trend has been to fine-tune a pre-trained model to achieve state-of-the-art performance on a downstream task. One natural example is the “Smart Reply” application where a pre-trained model is tuned to provide suggested responses for a given query message. Since these models are often tuned using sensitive data such as emails or chat transcripts, it is important to understand and mitigate the risk that the model leaks its tuning data. We investigate potential information leakage vulnerabilities in a typical Smart Reply pipeline and introduce a new type of active extraction attack that exploits canonical patterns in text containing sensitive data. We show experimentally that it is possible for an adversary to extract sensitive user information present in the training data. We explore potential mitigation strategies and demonstrate empirically how differential privacy appears to be an effective defense mechanism to such pattern extraction attacks.