

Distributed Learning Without Distress: Privacy-Preserving Empirical Risk Minimization

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Background on Empirical Risk Minimization

Given the following convex objective function:

Find O that minimizes the objective function:

 $\hat{\theta} = argmin J(\theta)$

 $\mathcal{T}(\theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{L}(\theta, X_i, Y_i) + \lambda N(\theta)$


Background on Empirical Risk Minimization

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Find Θ that minimizes the objective function: $(log(1+e^{-x_i \cdot \Theta y_i}))$ $\hat{\Theta} = argmin J(\Theta)$ $\left(\frac{1}{2}\left(X^{T}\theta - Y^{T}\right)^{2}\right)$




Background on Empirical Risk Minimization

Given the following convex objective function:

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Logistic Loss -X: 07: (Log(1+e))) Quadratic Loss $\hat{\Theta} = argmin J(\Theta)$



A randomized mechanism M is (ϵ, δ) -DP if for two neighbouring datasets D and D' $\frac{\Pr[M(0) \in S]}{\Pr[M(0') \in S]} \leq e^{\epsilon} + \delta$

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Given that sensitivity of M is:

 $\Delta M = \max_{0,0'} \| M(0) - M(0') \|$

We can ensure ϵ -DP if we sample Laplace noise:

Lap(b), where $b = \frac{\Delta M}{G}$



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
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Example: Logistic Regression

If D = (X, Y) such that $|| X || \leq 1$ and $Y \in \{-1, 1\}$

If Logistic Regression model M minimizes the following objective function:



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
Example: Logistic Regression

If D = (X, Y) such that $|| X_i || \leq 1$ and $Y_i \in \{-1, j\}$

If Logistic Regression model M minimizes the following objective function:

$$J(0) = \frac{1}{n} \frac{2}{2n} \log(1 + e^{-x_{i}^{2}}) + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2$$

 \therefore Mis E - DP if $\Theta \leftarrow \Theta^* + Lap(\frac{2}{n\lambda E})$



Background on Multi-Party Computation

Input of P1 is not revealed to P2



X

Secure Computation

f(X, X)

XL

P2

Input of P2 is not


revealed to P1

D = (X, Y)

n

Model Training

 $J(\Phi) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_{i}$ for t in T $\Theta \leftarrow \Theta$ return Θ



$$\mathcal{L}(\Theta, X_{i}, Y_{i}) + \lambda N(\Theta)$$


$$: - \eta \nabla J(\Theta)$$



D = (X, Y)

Model Training

for t in T: $\Theta \leftarrow \Theta - \eta \nabla J(\theta)$ return O




 $J(Q) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} l(Q, X_i, Y_i) + \lambda N(Q) + \beta \{ \alpha \in \frac{1}{n} \}$ Chaudhuri et al. (2011) **Objective Perturbation**



D = (X, Y)

Model Training

 $T(\Phi) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{L}(\Phi, X_{i}, Y) + \lambda N(\Phi) + \beta \{\Phi, h\}$ Chaudhuri et al. (2011) Objective Perturbation $for \ t \ in \ T:$ $\Theta \leftarrow \Theta - \eta \nabla J(\Phi)$ $return \Theta + \beta \{\Phi, h\}$ Chaudhuri et al. (2011) Output Perturbation






D = (X, Y)

Model Training

 $T(Q) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} L(Q, X_i, Y_i) + \lambda N(Q) + \beta \{ \alpha \in \frac{1}{n} \}$ for t in T: $\Theta \leftarrow \Theta - \eta (\nabla J(\theta) + \beta \{\alpha, \frac{1}{2}\})$ return $O + \beta \{ c \}$ Chaudhuri et al. (2011) Output Perturbation



Chaudhuri et al. (2011) **Objective** Perturbation

> Abadi et al. (2016) Gradient Perturbation




Multi-Party Setting: Output Perturbation

 $D_1 = (X_1, Y_1)$ $D_{2} = (X_{L}, Y_{L})$ <u>م</u>- $D_3 = (X_3, Y_3)$

n

 $D_{1} = (X_{1}, Y_{1})$ Model Training n $D_{2} = (X_{L}, Y_{2})$ Model <u>م</u>-Training $D_3 = (X_3, Y_3)$ Model Training





Multi-Party Setting: Output Perturbation 2

 $D_{1} = (X_{1}, Y_{1})$ Model Training $D_{2} = (X_{L}, Y_{L})$ Model Training $D_3 = (X_3, Y_3)$ Model Training

n

Pathak Chaudhuri

P

9⁽²⁾

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 Θ

(3)


Aggregate Models

Ba

 $\beta \propto \frac{1}{\sqrt{m \cdot n_{(1)}}}$

 $O = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \left(O^{(i)} + \beta_i \right)$

Extension of Chaudhuri et al. (2011)



Improved Output Perturbation

 $D_{1} = (X_{1}, Y_{1})$ Model Training n $D_{2} = (\chi_{L}, \chi_{2})$ Model **١**... Training $D_3 = (X_3, Y_3)$ Model Training

Pathak Chaudhuri Our Method

Aggregate Models

Bac -

 $\beta \propto \frac{1}{\sqrt{m} \cdot n_{(1)}}$


MPC $\Rightarrow \Theta = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \Theta + \beta \left[\frac{\alpha_{i}}{m} \right]$

(3) (3)


9⁽²⁾

9(1)

Our Method: Generate noise inside MPC



 $D_{1} = (X_{1}, Y_{1})$



Multi-Party Setting: Gradient Perturbation

Noise Required

 $\beta \propto \frac{1}{\sqrt{m} \cdot n(0)}$

Shokri & Shmatikov

Model Training




Shokri and Shmatikov (2015)



Improved Gradient Perturbation

 $D_{1} = (X, Y_{1})$ VJ(0) n $D_{2} = (X_{L}, Y_{L})$ Model Training for t in T: $\Theta \leftarrow \Theta - \eta \cdot (\frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} I_j (\Theta) + \beta \left[\cos \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^$ V J.(0) $D_3 = (X_3, Y_3)$ return O VJ2(9)


Shokri & Shmatikov Our Method




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Our Method: Generate noise inside MPC







KDDCup99 Dataset - Classification Task



*Violates the privacy budget





m = 100

*Violates the privacy budget


KDDCup99 Dataset - Classification Task


m = 1000

m = 50000









*Violates the privacy budget

KDDCup98 Dataset - Regression Task

Key Conclusion

Shown via two instantiations of Differential Privacy: 1. Output Perturbation 2. Gradient Perturbation

Generating noise inside MPC and adding it after secure aggregation allows reducing the required noise in multi-party setting.

Source Code

https://github.com/bargavj/distributedMachineLearning

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